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ABSTRACT 
The choice of efficient contractual form is often framed as the selection of a degree of hierarchical 
intensity suitably matching the level of contractual hazards. We posit that technology collaboration 
contracts are also responsive to the configuration of resources and to coordination concerns and that 
contractual solutions may be multidimensional and differ ‘in kind’. A sample of joint R&D 
biotechnology agreements provides broad support for propositions concerning the antecedents. 
Moreover, we find that the way certain contracts are chosen in response to various contingencies, 
challenges the idea that they can be usefully characterized as ‘intermediate’ between polar forms of 
governance. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Research on contract choices in interfirm alliances has been mainly influenced by transaction cost 
economics (henceforth, TCE). Despite expanding its concepts over time, TCE remains chiefly 
concerned with those contracting problems that would vanish but for the joint occurrence of 
opportunism and bounded rationality (Williamson 1996: 14). While such problems may be 
paramount in transactions involving high conflict potential, when the activities contemplated by the 
partners to an alliance are complex, the governance model adopted is likely to reflect also the 
coordination requirements of the task at hand and the resources the parties need to bring to the 
alliance. In other words, we can say that within certain contracts, the planning of performance is at 
least as fundamental as the planning of risk (Macneil 1975). 
This paper further expands on this line of thinking that was started by Gulati and Singh (1998), and 
analyzes whether traditional predictors of intra- and inter-organizational coordination modes are 
useful when the explanandum is specifically the formal, enforceable, agreement. 
Allowing for the possibility that different governance forms differ not just in degree but also in kind 
represents a second purported contribution of this study. In particular we shall argue that the choice 
between arm’s length and hierarchical contracts is too stark an alternative, and that certain problems 
of inter-firm collaboration under conditions of radical uncertainty call for an additional, 
‘associational’ governance model that can hardly be described as an intermediate form. We 
investigate the issue in the biopharmaceutical industry. 
CONTRACTUAL TYPES 
TCE argues that under conditions of information complexity coupled with the potential of conflict 
of interests the control provided for by hierarchical governance is to be preferred to market-based 
forms. However, if the word ‘hierarchy’ is taken at face value, as indicating decision-making 
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structures based on centralized authority, it is dubious that hierarchical governance structures can be 
comparatively efficient even in highly uncertain contexts (e.g.: Burns & Stalker 1961). Truly, in 
many studies inspired by TCE, ‘hierarchical intensity’ is just a convenient label for a bundle of 
heterogeneous governance mechanisms. Thus we need to specify more accurately what the 
constituent elements of hierarchy are and to consider which of them can adequately serve the goals 
that are asked of the contractual governance of R&D collaborations. A brief review of some 
representative studies in the strategic alliance literature (cfr. Appendix A) reveals that the 
mechanisms that are said to ensure hierarchical control are quite heterogeneous and that several of 
them have little applicability to joint R&D collaboration agreements, particularly in the 
biotechnology sector.  
What remains of ‘hierarchical’ governance, once multiple mechanisms have been ruled out on 
various accounts, are resource commitments, coupled with arrangements to lock them in for a 
suitably long period.1 Before being a safeguard against the risk of opportunism, from a cognitive 
viewpoint commitments of resources may be the only feasible contracting strategy under conditions 
of uncertainty. On one side, it is easier to specify ex ante a capability to deal effectively with a 
certain situation than an action to mechanically cope with it (Knight, 1921: 298). On the other side, 
resources are characterized by high flexibility and width of possible services and applications 
(Penrose 1959). Such flexibility largely relieves from the need to ensure adaptability through the 
specification of many contractual contingencies, which, in turn, eases the burden of verification and 
makes the contract more enforceable. Enforceable resource commitments have also the potential to 
align the parties’ interests: to the extent that a party has pledged a resource to the exclusive service 
of a certain relationship, that party’s threat point with regard to that resource is zero.  
An agreement to pool resources also needs to be complemented by rules about the sharing of the 
surplus, decision-making and the termination of the relationship (Vanberg 1994). While alternative 
solutions may be viable, to the extent that the resources that are pledged to the relationship are 
different, complementary capabilities from the two parties, allowing both parties to take decisions 
in their respective domains of expertise and to bear the wealth effects of their decisions serves the 
purpose of efficiency (Fama & Jensen 1983). Accordingly we would expect that polyarchic decision 
making and shared residual claimancy would be typically observed in such agreements. 
Locating the contracting model just described on the market-hierarchy continuum is rather difficult. 
We suggest that such model is more conveniently treated as differing ‘in kind’ from the other two 
archetypes, and we follow Grandori (2001 and 2005) in designating it as ‘associational contracting’. 
                                                 
1 This section draws several ideas from Grandori (2001, 2005) and Grandori and Furlotti (2007). 
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Although associational contracts can be argued to possess certain advantages under conditions of 
radical uncertainty, they also entail costs. Thus, for simple transactions market-like contracts may 
be the preferred alternative. Further, when just one party provides valuable specific knowledge 
inputs, efficient decision management may require delegating the initiation and implementation of 
decision to that party, and assigning control to the other, to assuage agency concerns. In this case a 
more hierarchical and bureaucratic governance structure may be advisable (Fama & Jensen 1983). 
A close correspondence with the associational archetype has been observed in venture capital 
financing contracts (Kaplan & Strömberg 2003). Four mini-cases described in Grandori and Furlotti 
(2007) illustrate how biopharmaceutical alliance contracts also resemble the three contractual 
models we have just outlined. 
PREDICTORS OF FORMAL ALLIANCE GOVERNANCE 
What influences the choice of the contractual governance of alliances? The factors we consider are 
referable to two fundamental ways of viewing organizations: the first focusing on the task 
dimensions, the second emphasizing resources.  
Uncertainty and contractual type 
Task uncertainty is often used as a predictor in empirical studies investigating contractual design. In 
general, there seems to be convergence of results supporting the proposition that greater uncertainty 
favors the adoption of less detailed contractual clauses (e.g. Crocker & Reynolds 1993) and of less 
complex contracts (i.e., shorter, with fewer provisions) (Saussier 2000). In terms of our typology, 
this is unfavorable to the adoption of bureaucratic contracts.  
From classical organizational theory we know that the generic bureaucratic model is characterized 
by standardization, formalization, specialization and centralization (Pugh, et al. 1963). 
Standardization and formalization (in the specific sense of a detailed writing and filing of 
procedures), are at a disadvantage when the problem to be solved requires the pursuit of not 
previously attempted combinations of actions and resources (Burns & Stalker 1961). As to 
centralization, it may fail for cognitive reasons (Radner 1997) but it may also be useful to prevent 
shirking and multitasking (Holmström & Milgrom 1991) and to safeguard against knowledge 
spillovers (Oxley 1997). Therefore, upon carefully balancing its various mechanisms, the 
bureaucratic model may not be wholly unsuitable for managing technological alliances.  
Further we can argue that under conditions of radical, non-probabilistic uncertainty simple ex-post 
adaptation achieved by means of bureaucratic governance may not be enough of a solution to 
contracting problems since what is required is rather the construction of a valid model of the world 
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(Grandori 2001). We maintain also that the knowledge resources that are relevant to problem-
solving and discovery are often less than perfectly substitutable (Polanyi 1966; Nelson & Winter 
1982: 105). For these reasons we can argue that organizational structures that ensure the bonding of 
a certain amount of specialized resources to the mission of solving an epistemically complex 
problem should on average outperform alternative structures where resources are insufficient, not 
specialized, and easily diverted to competing goals.  
While bound to some extent to the solution of the focal problem, the resources brought to bear on it 
cannot be overly constrained, lest they lose the possibility of creating those novel combinations of 
activities and resources upon which innovation is typically based (von Hippel, 1988). The 
foreclosure to resources of the opportunities to be applied outside the domain defined by the 
‘problem’, and the granting of freedom from specific forms of application, are, as we saw, the main 
defining traits of an associational contract. Finally, it is also well known that conditions of radical 
uncertainty hinder the use of high powered incentives (Milgrom & Roberts 1992) and the 
specification of performance (McNeil 1978) that are typical of market contracting. Bringing these 
arguments together we can argue what follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Associational contracts will be chosen over bureaucratic contracts, and these over 
market-like contracts, for transactions involving higher levels of uncertainty. 
Interdependence 
Interdependence defined on types of asset usage 
One definitional trait of alliances is that each participant firm brings assets and capabilities to it. 
Assets and capabilities can be understood as ‘resources’, that is, “sets of potential services [that] can, 
in large part, be defined independently of their use” (Penrose, 1959: 25). Owing to this property, an 
asset could be employed for its typical services, or, alternatively, as a currency, a medium of 
exchange (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). In technology collaborations at least one party’s capabilities 
are used for its characteristic services. We posit that participation of both parties as contributors of 
activities to the R&D project entails a different level of involvement and of coordination 
requirements. We call these coordination requirements as ‘activity-based interdependence’ and the 
case where assets of one party are used just as currencies as ‘exchange-based interdependence’. 
The rich control apparatus with which bureaucratic contracts are endowed makes them well 
equipped to deal with non-trivial degrees of interdependence. By contrast, market-like contracts, 
which rely mainly on autonomous coordination, should be better suited to regulate a flow of goods 
and services between the parties. The case for associational contracts is less clear. For all these 
reasons we advance the following proposition: 
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Hypothesis 2: Bureaucratic contracts will be chosen for transactions involving higher levels of 
activity-based interdependence. 
Interdependence defined on technology structure 
Alliance agreements reveals that the parties possess at least a rudimentary understanding of whether 
the characteristics of the output envisaged and their respective knowledge bases are such that the 
production process is neatly decomposable or not. Would knowing as much bear implications for an 
efficient organizational configuration? A production process where the activities are not technically 
separable and cannot be carried out in isolation from each other without loss of efficiency is called 
‘team production’ (Alchian & Demsetz 1972). Team production gives rise to a metering problem, 
makes it difficult to rely on individual incentive rewards and hinders the specific attribution of costs. 
To the extent that each actor is not solely in charge of its own subtask, we aver that team production 
requires also the specification of procedures for decision making (Vanberg, 1994). All these 
features seem to negate as many defining elements of the main dimension market-like contracts are 
based upon. To be sure, team production is partly unfavorable also to some aspects of bureaucratic 
contracts but they appear of less fundamental importance. Indeed, Mayer and Bercovitz (2003) 
observed greater contractual formalization under conditions of task interdependence. All these 
intuitions lead to the following proposition. 
Hypothesis 3: Bureaucratic contracts will be chosen for transactions involving team production. 
While a ‘community of fate’ may have some advantages when it is difficult to measure each other’s 
contributions, cheaper mechanisms for the control of motivational problems ought to be available. 
Thus, we treat the comparative assessment of associational and market-like contracting under team 
production as an empirical question. 
Interdependence defined on the scope of activities 
Alliance scope, in the sense of whether an alliance encompasses just R&D or also manufacturing 
and distribution, can affect the level of contractual hazards (contractibility, spill over), and call for 
safeguards in the form of greater hierarchical intensity. However we posit that the main channel 
through which a wider functional scope can influence organizational structure is by creating 
additional and different coordination requirements. For instance, as manufacturing is put under the 
umbrella of the alliance, things like the timing of the orders, the compliance of the deliverables with 
quality specifications, and the continuity of supplies become salient. As a result of these conditions 
of ‘sequential interdependence’, we expect a greater use of programming (Thompson 1967).  
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A wider functional scope is likely to compound interdependence with a greater potential for conflict 
of interests, which calls for the formalization of procedures for adjustment (Williamson 1979).2 
Moreover, the lower cognitive uncertainty of downstream activities means that cost control and 
time savings become primary ways to add value, adding the pressure to increase standardization and 
monitoring. All the factors mentioned above seem to indicate that a wider functional span will lead 
to alliances with more bureaucratic contracts.  
The type of interdependence that we have just described vastly exceeds the information processing 
capability of market-like coordination (Thompson 1967). Moreover, the resources that are 
necessary to the performance of downstream activities are likely to be more substitutable than those 
that are required by R&D. Therefore the addition of downstream activities should not increase the 
need for a lasting pooling of resources through associational contracts. Thus we do not expect a 
significant association of a wider scope with this contractual type. Overall, we advance the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Bureaucratic contracts will be chosen for transactions involving a wider functional 
scope 
Distribution of knowledge 
The knowledge that is necessary to accomplish an R&D project can be distributed between the two 
parties of an alliance, or it can be concentrated and, in the limit, contributed by just one of them. 
When one party can contribute R&D competencies and the other has manufacturing and 
commercialization capabilities, it can also be argued that their knowledge bases are quite 
differentiated. 
Several studies have stressed the distribution of the requisite knowledge, and the differentiation of 
the knowledge bases of the actors, as possible predictors of organizational configurations from the 
point of view of the effectiveness at problem solving. Burns and Stalker (1961) claimed that when 
the environment is turbulent firms have to rely on the (decentralized) knowledge of their workers, 
rather than on know-how embodied in rules and procedures, and the accompanying organizational 
structure needs to be characterized by intense horizontal relationships, rather than by hierarchy, and 
by low levels of formalization. For their part, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967: 72) found that influence 
is more effective at resolving interdepartmental conflict and promoting organizational performance, 
if it concentrated at the managerial level where knowledge to make decisions is available. In more 
                                                 
2 A change in product specifications required at the mass-production stage affects more units of input than changes 
requested when a product is still at the prototype stage. Moreover, the move from R&D to production is often a move 
from concepts to artifacts, which certainly have lower plasticity. 
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recent times, the literature on network governance and on the new organizational forms has 
expressed a similar viewpoint. 
Studies of organizational learning and organizational knowledge have argued that as knowledge 
differentiation increases so does the diversity in languages, perceptions, practices. This is expected 
to reduce the capacity to utilize the knowledge of others (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) and to call for 
increasingly more powerful knowledge integration mechanisms. However, in the limit the 
combination of different knowledge bases becomes no longer possible and the parties can exchange 
“the output of the application of knowledge, but not have access to the source” (Grandori, 2001: 
391). 
In the specific field of R&D biopharmaceutical alliances, when the biotechnology firm possesses all 
the know-how that is relevant for the ‘upstream’ research activities, no real transfer of the core 
technology is possible. The counterparty must be satisfied with receiving the results of the 
discovery activities. We argue that a rather autonomous, disconnected pattern of decision making, 
supported by market-like contracting is a suitable model of interaction in the case of concentrated 
knowledge and, a contrario, that this is not the case with distributed knowledge. 
When both parties contribute their capabilities to the R&D project, some degree of integration of 
their knowledge bases cannot be dispensed with and the intense coordination that is required to 
blend different knowledge bases into an innovative output needs to be sustained by the sharing of 
risk, responsibilities and benefits as well as by an intense communitarian interaction (Grandori & 
Neri 1998). Associational contracts provide precisely for all these elements. Combining these 
arguments we advance the following proposition: 
Hypothesis 5: Associational contracts will be chosen over bureaucratic contracts, and these over 
market-like contracts, for transactions involving an equal distribution of knowledge resources. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
Sample and dependent variable 
We tested the implications of the arguments above with data obtained from the content analysis of 
US pharmaceutical biotechnology agreements. The contracts have been provided by Recombinant 
Capital (Recap), a San Francisco Bay area-based consulting firm. Our sampling criteria excluded 
those alliances where one of the parties was a non-business organization and those that did not 
include any element of R&D. We also left out agreements terminated ahead of time, as a means to 
bias the sample toward successful alliances. Finally, through random selection we picked 79 
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alliance contracts with a constraint of approximately equal representation of early stage and late 
stage alliances. The contracts in our sample date from 1989 until 2005. 
Our dependent variable (FORM) takes on one of three values, which correspond to the three 
contractual types that were identified through a preliminary taxonomical analysis. Details of the 
process that led to the identification of these types are provided in Appendix B. 
FORM = 1  for associational agreements 
FORM = 2 for bureaucratic agreements 
FORM = 3  for market-like contracts 
Independent variables 
Uncertainty. We claim that in biotechnology research the lack of valid knowledge concerning 
cause-effect relationships is the more severe, the farther the drug discovery process is from the 
commercial release. To support our claim we can look at the ‘attrition rate’ statistics (the number 
molecules discarded during the process) in Table 1.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
Thus the stage of research at the time of signing an alliance agreement is our proxy for uncertainty.3 
For our initial analysis we recode Recap’s original measure into a three categories variable 
(STAGE), where the stage of Discovery is assigned a value of 1, and the remaining stages are 
evenly subdivided in two classes with value 2 and 3 respectively.4 
Interdependence defined on type of asset usage. This variable measures whether the contribution of 
assets to the R&D project by either party is purely financial or whether both are actively engaged in 
the project. The former type of asset contribution defines an exchange-based interdependence, while 
the latter is the defining criterion of activity-based interdependence. This variable, called 
ACTIVITY, was coded as follows: 
- 0: one side performs R&D activities 
- 1: both sides perform R&D activities 
Interdependence defined on technology structure. The variable called TEAM measures whether the 
performance by the parties of their respective tasks, requires an extent of collaboration that prevents 
the possibility of specific, individual attribution of the results of the R&D activities. Since what we 
are concerned with are the typical expected outcomes of the R&D project, the problem can be 
                                                 
3 A detailed description of the measure is provided in Appendix C. 
4 To check for robustness of findings, alternative codifications have also being used. 
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reformulated as one of observing whether the alliance may give rise to joint inventions or not. In 
sum, TEAM was coded as follows: 
- 0: decomposable production (no joint inventions envisaged) 
- 1: team production (joint inventions envisaged) 
Interdependence defined on the range of functional activities. This variable measures whether an 
alliance is specifically dedicated to R&D or whether in encompasses also sales and distribution 
activities. This variable, called SCOPE, is coded as follows: 
- 0: pure R&D 
- 1: mixed activities (R&D and sales)5 
Distribution of knowledge resources. Observations concerning the distribution of knowledge 
resources in the R&D project, as reflected by contributions of intellectual property and the 
performance of R&D tasks, are captured by a variable called BALANCEKW that is coded as 
follows:6 
- 0: About equal contributions 
- 1: R&D firm makes dominant or exclusive contribution 
Control variables 
In addition to the independent variables featured in the hypotheses we also included some control 
variables that may impact on the contractual choice. The indicator variable EXIST measures 
whether the contract stipulates, on top of the R&D collaboration, a transfer or rights on existing 
technology for commercial exploitation outside the collaboration. The reason for being concerned 
with this variable is that an external observer may think the alliance is a genuine collaborative effort, 
while in reality it could be little more than a licensing agreement, accompanied by ancillary 
activities.  
Another dummy (VERTICAL) was included to indicate whether the alliance was horizontal 
(established between biotechnology firms) or vertical (established between a biotechnology and a 
pharmaceutical firm). This variable can be understood as a crude measure of the difference in the 
financial strength of the alliance partners. A third dummy variable (INTERNATL) indicates 
whether one partner in the alliance is from a country other than the US, thus entailing possibly 
different preferences as to the contractual type, or greater contractual hazards due to monitoring 
difficulties and a lower understanding of each other’s expectations. 
                                                 
5 In order to carry out robustness analyses we tried also alternative coding of SCOPE and obtained similar results. 
6 Contribution of effort and capabilities to downstream processes where not considered 
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Statistical Methodology 
We assessed the probability of the choice between the three contractual types with a multinomial 
logistic regression model and Huber-White sandwich estimators of variance. Table 2 presents 
descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
Table 3 presents the results of our analyses. Each model estimates coefficients indicating how 
covariates affect the choice of associational and bureaucratic contracts relative to the choice of 
market-like agreements. In all the models after the first, also coefficients for the choice of 
associational versus bureaucratic contracts are presented. Overall, our hypotheses find good support 
in the data, but some are rejected. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
We discuss only the results of the full model (Model 3). The addition of the full set of the variables 
of interest results into a considerable improvement of the predictive power of the model, as 
reflected in the chi-square test on the observed log likelihoods. The negative and significant 
intercepts of equations A and B indicate that in correspondence of zeros of our covariates market-
like contracts have higher probabilities of being chosen. All the indicators of higher levels of 
interdependence (ACTIVITY, TEAM, and SCOPE) are significantly associated with greater use of 
bureaucratic contracts, in line with our hypotheses 2, 3 and 4. The configuration of the knowledge 
resources contributed to the alliance (BALANCEKW) also turns out to be an important predictor of 
contractual choice: where knowledge is more distributed the parties are more likely to favor 
associational contracts. However, conditions of distributed knowledge do not significantly affect the 
choice between bureaucratic and market-like contracts. The proxies for uncertainty, that had some 
explanatory power in Model 2, loose statistical significance altogether in the full model.  
We have also analyzed the substantive significance of our results by comparing the discrete changes 
in the predicted probabilities of the different contractual alternatives for unit changes in our 
independent variables. Each of the five covariates that were found significant turned out to have a 
considerable impact on the average predicted probability of the three contractual types, with 
BALANCEKW displaying the largest impact of all. 
One final analysis involved the comparison of odds ratios (Figure 1). The reason for taking an 
interest in odd ratios is that they help clarifying whether associational contracts can be considered 
‘intermediate’ between the other two contractual types or not. If the ‘intermediate’ interpretation 
were justified we would expect that for any given change in contextual variables, the degree to 
which associational contracts would be found better-matched to a different environment, and thus 
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chosen with greater odds, would be intermediate to the corresponding degrees of the other two 
archetypical categories as, by definition, intermediate governance forms possess, to a lesser extent, 
the same adaptation mechanisms of more fundamental ones (Williamson 1991). In Figure 1 we see 
that an intermediate-like behavior can be seen in the response to activity-based interdependence and 
team production while this is not true for changes of SCOPE and BALANCEKW. In the latter case 
the odds ratios of associational contracts lie outside the range defined by the odds ratios of the other 
contractual forms. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our findings confirm that the different types of interdependence are important predictors of 
contractual form and explain the choice between market-like and bureaucratic contracts. This result 
echoes the findings of Gulati and Singh (1998) and those of Mayer and Bercovitz (2003). 
Our findings also confirm that the configuration of knowledge resources matters, that it has the 
strongest predictive power among the variables we have investigated, and that it impacts heavily on 
the choice to forge associations. Uncertainty was not found significant in the full model, possibly 
due to the limited size of the dataset.  
Vis-à-vis certain predictors, associational contracts behave as intermediate forms between market-
like and bureaucratic contracts. Thus for some practical purposes characterizing contractual forms 
as points along a continuum is a useful heuristic. However, the behavior of associational contracts 
vis-à-vis other variables vindicates our choice to treat this governance form as qualitatively 
different. 
Despite several limitations, this study has demonstrated that using conceptually-defined contractual 
types in empirical research is possible and that it can disclose aspects of the governance of interfirm 
relationships not easily revealed by the use of taxonomies borrowed from practice. 
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APPENDIX A 
A summary of how various studies spell out the constituting elements of ‘hierarchy’ 
Reference Elements Comments 
Hennart (1988) Equity investment The sharing of profits aligns interests. However, the 
pricing of intermediate goods which do not have clear 
arm’s length prices determines how profits are divided 
between the JV’s parent companies, thus often becoming 
a source of contractual difficulties. 
Pisano (1989) Equity investment, restrictions on 
rights to sell positions off 
Equity entails better monitoring opportunities through 
representation on the partner’s board. Agreements on 
relative contributions are said to be enforceable. 
Oxley (1997) Monitoring, decision and veto 
rights, sharing of profits, hostages 
‘Bilateral adaptation’, also mentioned, (quantity 
adjustments, formulaic price adjustments, contingent 
clauses). 
Gulati & Singh 
(1998) 
Monitoring, decision rights, 
sharing of profits, standard 
operating procedures, non-market 
pricing, dispute resolution 
mechanisms, plans and rules  
Emphasis shifted from reward systems to authority  
(‘fiat’, ‘command structures’ and ‘hierarchical control’) 
Santoro & 
McGill (2005) 
Hostages, contractual 
contingencies and ownership 
Characterization of hierarchical intensity not seen as 
being particularly problematic 
 
APPENDIX B 
Construction of the dependent variable 
The dependent variable FORM is the result of a classificatory study carried out on 79 agreements. Each agreement 
was coded on 27 items of contractual structure. Measured items included: a) substantive issues, such as 
arrangements on monetary rewards, property rights and commitments on tasks and resources; b) procedural issues, 
such as rules for decision making, mechanisms for enforcement, monitoring, coordination, dispute resolution; c) 
contract-level characteristics, as the length of the contractual document, its duration and the use of state contingent 
covenants. 
Through a principal component analysis of the original variables, three factors loading on 13 items have been 
identified which, together, accounted for about 55% of total sample variance. Factor loadings suggested the 
following labeling and interpretation of the three dimensions: 
• Bureaucratic intensity: extent to which the contract is articulated, contingencies are explicitly spelled out; 
control mechanisms and constraints are specified. 
• Associational intensity: extent of use of cost sharing (as opposed to specific incidence), open ended 
relationships, low task specification 
• Market intensity: extent of use of performance incentives and hostages  
Through a k-means cluster analysis performed on the scores on these contractual dimensions, three contractual 
types have been identified. An alternative clustering procedure yielded the same number of number of groupings 
suggested by a priori considerations. As shown in the left-hand table below, each contractual type scored high 
along one dimension (1), was significantly below sample average along a second (-1), and was not significantly 
different from average along the third (0). Accordingly we interpreted the contractual types in terms of their 
‘dominant’ dimension and labeled them respectively ‘associational’, ‘bureaucratic’ and ‘market-like’. Item-by-item 
characterization of clusters corroborated the interpretation based on cluster centers. Cluster memberships provided 
the three values of the variable FORM.  
FINAL CLUSTER CENTERS 
Cluster 
 1 2 3 
Bureaucratic intensity 0 1 -1 
Associational intensity 1 -1 0 
Market intensity -1 0 1  
CLUSTER DISTRIBUTION 
 Cluster  N % Cases 
1 – Associational 17 22% 
2 – Bureaucratic 34 43% 
3 – Market-like 28 35% 
Valid 79 100%  
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APPENDIX C 
Definition of alliance stage 
 Stage Definition 
1 Discovery No lead product candidate identified 
2 Lead Molecule Lead product candidate identified but no animal testing yet undertaken 
3 Pre-Clinical Data from animal models obtained, but human trials not yet started 
4 Formulation Research on a vehicle or agent for the administration of a drug 
5 Phase I Human testing focused on safety begun 
6 Phase II Small-scale human testing focused on efficacy begun 
7 Phase III Large-scale human testing focused on efficacy begun 
8 BLA/NDA filed Biological License Application or New Drug Application filed with the FDA 
9 Approved Drug approved for commercialization 
 
Table 1 
The drug discovery process: length, costs and attrition rates 
Molecules entering the phase Phase PhRMA 2004 expenditures* Length (years) 
5000-10000 Drug discovery 5.5 
250 Pre-Clinical 
9.6 1 
Phase I 1.5 
Phase II 2.0 5 Clinical 
Phase III 
15.9 
2.5 
 FDA Review 3.4 1.5 
1 Large-scale manufacturing   
Adapted from PhRMA (2006), www.bio.org. * Figures in bln USD. 
 
 
Table 2 
Polychoric correlations and descriptive statistics 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 FORM 1         
2 STAGE 0.13 1        
3 ACTIVITY -0.28 0.23 1       
4 TEAM -0.22 -0.04 0.27 1      
5 SCOPE -0.43 -0.55 0.16 0.50 1     
6 BALANCEKW -0.54 0.30 0.17 -0.40 -0.02 1    
7 EXIST 0.14 -0.04 -0.44 -0.18 -0.53 -0.53 1   
8 VERTICAL 0.13 -0.05 -0.13 0.12 0.13 -0.44 0.05 1  
9 INTERNATL 0.30 -0.02 -0.22 0.07 0.04 -0.39 0.00 0.68 1
           
 Obs 79 79 79 77 79 77 77 79 79
 Mean 2.14 2.20 0.65 0.78 0.44 0.23 0.25 0.56 0.39
 Std.Dev. 0.75 0.85 0.48 0.42 0.50 0.43 0.43 0.50 0.49
 Min 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
  Max 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Table 3 
Contractual form: multinomial logit models 
  Model (1)   Model (2)   Model (3) 
 A B  A B A(B)  A B A(B) 
STAGE1    0.54 -0.21 0.75  1.59    -0.26    1.82    
    (0.74) (0.67) (0.79)  (1.27)    (0.77)    (1.31)    
STAGE2    1.44 1.74* -0.30  2.06    2.16    -0.10    
    (0.99) (0.88) (0.74)  (2.14)    (2.20)    (1.07)    
ACTIVITY        0.92    2.62**  -1.70*   
        (0.97)    (1.04)    (0.93)    
TEAM        1.47    4.02*** -2.55**  
        (1.09)    (1.42)    (1.04)    
SCOPE        2.67*** 1.94**  0.73    
        (1.01)    (0.98)    (0.92)    
BALANCEKW        5.00*** 2.27    2.73**  
        (1.64)    (1.46)    (1.09)    
EXIST -0.47 -0.95  -0.52 -1.02 0.50  2.19**  0.32    1.87*   
 (0.72) (0.65)  (0.76) (0.69) (0.74)  (1.09)    (0.94)    (1.01)    
VERTICAL 0.00 0.76  -0.14 0.56 -0.70  0.62    1.17    -0.55    
 (0.68) (0.68)  (0.67) (0.71) (0.69)  (0.91)    (0.83)    (0.81)    
INTERNATL -1.27* -0.76  -1.17* -0.58 -0.59  -1.29    -0.45    -0.84    
 (0.70) (0.68)  (0.66) (0.70) (0.71)  (0.90)    (0.82)    (0.79)    
Intercept 0.21 0.34  -0.14 0.11 -0.25  -5.81**  -6.90*** 1.09    
 (0.48) (0.47)  (0.61) (0.51) (0.59)  (2.32)    (2.46)    (1.75)    
                           
N 73   73    73      
Log-likelihood -74.39   -71.03    -47.35      
Chi-square 7.08   19.62    47.21      
P 0.313     0.033       0.000       
Dependent variable is FORM. Base outcome: Market-like. In last column of Models 2 and 3 base outcome is 
Bureaucratic. Outcomes: A: "Associational"; B: "Bureaucratic"; A(B): "Associational" (compared with 
"Bureaucratic"). Positive coefficients indicate increased probability that firms select the specified contractual type. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Plot of odds ratios 
 Factor Change Scale Relative to Category Market-intensive
 Logit Coefficient Scale Relative to Category Market-intensive 
 1 
 0
 1.87 
 .63
 3.49 
 1.25
 6.53 
 1.88
 12.2 
 2.5
 22.8 
 3.13
 42.61 
 3.75
 79.64 
 4.38
 148.84 
 5
 A  B M
 A  B M
 A B M
 A B M
 ACTIVITY-0/1
 TEAM-0/1
 SCOPE-0/1
 BALANCEKW-0/1
 
Odd ratios (a.k.a. “factor change coefficients”): upper scale. A: "Associational"; B: "Bureaucratic"; M: “Market-like” 
